Wednesday, April 17, 2013

What’s Slowing America Down?

Conventional wisdom regarding recessions says that the severity of a recession determines the intensity of the recovery. Friedman famously illustrated this theory by comparing the economy to an elastic band, the harder you pull back the harder the band is going to snap back. Since the end of the recession in 2009 though, growth has averaged about 2.2% annually. The average has been about 4.2% for the last seven recoveries. So, what is different now? An article from the Economist provides interesting answers to this question.

The first is that there are underlying trends that have to do with recovery and that these trends were slowing before the crisis hit. These trends are supply of workers, capital, and technology. Ultimately this is potential growth. One paper published in 2012 states that 80% of the shortfall in growth can be accounted for by slower potential.

The article provides some explanations for the slowing of America’s potential. One reason is that since the end of 2007 the population who can be in the labor force increased by 11.6 million while the actual amount of people who joined the labor force during this time was 1.6 million. This dragged the rate of people actually in the labor force from 66% to 63.5% (lowest in 30 years). The article also argues that the reason for a decrease in TFP (total-factor productivity) is because the “productivity-enhancing  impact of the internet has begun to wear off.” They don’t have any numbers supporting this claim, but it would be interesting to see more research done on this. 

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Controversy over debt and growth

A little while ago, we discussed whether there is a unanimous threshold of the debt-to-GDP ratio that would consistently create problems for economies. (Our preliminary conclusion was that there was no unanimously agreed-upon threshold.)

Two recent studies now follow up on this issue. First, Reinhart and Rogoff suggest in their “main result [...] that [...] median growth rates for countries with public debt over 90 percent of GDP are roughly one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several percent lower.”

Second, however, a re-analysis of their data by Herndon, Ash, and Pollin suggests that the above conclusion has some problems and cannot be sustained by the data.

This is an interesting exchange worth following if you are interested in the implications of high debt-to-GDP ratios - a phenomenon that has not been irrelevant in the past few years.

Edit: why is this relevant? Not just for theoretical concerns, but also for the debate about the merit of austerity policies. See two takes here:
1. Is the evidence for austerity based on an Excel spreadsheet error? (Washington Post - Wonkblog)
and 
2. An update on the Reinhart and Rogoff critique and some observations (Tyler Cowen's blog).

Foreign Direct Investment and Corruption in Nigeria

Last week in lecture we discussed who gives aid and for what reasons. With the onset of the Millennium Development Goals, Foreign aid has increased in the global south in an attempt to combat the dire situations in the developing world. We discussed how "good aid" requires transparency of the donor and beneficiary, and an accountable, democratic government in the recipient country. Adversely, we determined that "bad aid" is attributed to corrupt, autocratic regimes where a fragmentation exists in the population.

Nigeria is an intriguing example into the discrepancy between "good aid" and "bad aid." As a nation  rich in natural resources and its significantly large size, Nigeria has attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) from the donor governments of the world. The potential for economic growth and development in Nigeria is promising. Yet, the level of corruption in the oil industry has prohibited the wealth from the sale of this demanded resource to find its way to the poorest of Nigerians. The unequal distribution of wealth and investment has created a significant gap between the rich and poor. In an Economist article, the author references this emerging problem, "Some 60% of Nigerians still live below the poverty line, while a rich elite—“the top million”, as it is sometimes jestingly called—educates its children privately (often abroad), relies on private health care and its own electricity, and is generally immune to the travails of ordinary Nigerian life" (The Economist, April 13 2013).

Along with the unequal distribution of FDI inflows into Nigeria, unemployment has reached 23 percent (The Arab News, March 1 2013). Additionally, political insecurity has lead donor governments to question whether or not to keep aiding Nigeria. In an article in the Arab News, the author describes this paradigm presenting FDI to Nigeria, "Yet investors remain reluctant to put funds into long term job-creating areas like agriculture or manufacturing until President Goodluck Jonathan makes good on promises to reform things like power, roads and the food industry" (The Arab News, March 1 2013). While the illuminating promise of economic growth in Nigeria is focused on its oil sector, clearly further FDI inflows must be distributed to promoting sustainable, practical, and essential needs of the entire population.

These articles conclude varying points. In the economist, the author states that, "But it is hard, in the short run, to see how Nigeria will turn into a prosperous, equitable and decent democracy" (The Economist, April 13 2013). This conclusion relates back to the concept of "good" versus "bad" aid. As a trait of "good aid," democratic regimes are important for ensuring the equal and effective distribution of funds. In the case of Nigeria, until the President and government take steps to combat corruption, they may be faced with a decline in FDI. Perhaps a solution, for the donors giving to Nigeria, would be to specialize their funds into allocating to a specific good or service that would target the poorest of the population. The author of the Arab News article argues, "Either way, until investment gets refocused into areas that create jobs, poverty in Nigeria will remain stubbornly high" (The Arab News, March 1 2013).

LINKS



Monday, April 15, 2013

Studying migration patterns via IP use

In advance of our upcoming discussion of migration, this is a potentially interesting and certainly innovative study. The authors use IP addresses for users of Yahoo! services to identify temporary and more permanent migration patterns.

La Strega e der Dummkopf


International relations are often characterized by extreme politeness and strict adherence to social etiquette.  Even competing powers who share little in common, such as China and the United States, find the time for political niceties.  It was therefore even more surprising to read that Italy's then-Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was caught referring to Angela Merkel, Germany's Prime Minister, as a "culona inchiavabile."  While it is amusing to finally catch a glimpse of the personal thoughts of a head of state, the reactions sparked by Berlusconi's misstep were anything but funny.  Many Italians were outraged at their Prime Minister's remarks, but rallied behind him after Italy was publicly ridiculed by several European Union countries, most notably France and Germany. Apparently, nothing unites a country like being on the receiving end of international ridicule.

The relationship that Italy and Germany share has always been close, but the creation of the European Union has added an additional dynamic.  Northern Italy's strong Germanic influence is noticeable almost everywhere: some northern towns speak a dialect of Italian that borrows heavily from German (and is almost unrecognizable to southern Italians); public transportation management matches German methods, and not the notoriously inefficient South; and economic activity in the region is dominated by the production of machinery and other high-skill goods.  The division between the two countries is first apparent after the creation of the European Union, where both countries lost domestic monetary autonomy.  The loss of domestic monetary autonomy is important because Germany and Italy traditionally, and in recent times, have had almost opposite views on the correct way to manage a national economy.  Generally, Germany has tended towards more conservative policy that focuses on maintaining low levels of inflation while Italy has tended towards more liberal policy that focuses on economic growth even in the face of a growing debt and deficit.

These contrasting opinions on economic management have led to friction between the two countries as the European Union struggles to haul itself out of the global recession.  The European Union's power lies in the ability of its 27 member states to act collectively; however, if any of the members choose to free-ride, the collective action of the group will be less efficient and more prone to failure.  Italy promised the EU to reduce its deficit, in part by crafting two austerity budgets, but at the same time the Italians refused to pass a stimulus package, as the rest of the EU had already done.  Italian's semi-commitment to EU monetary policy, resulting from a combination of foolish politicians and nationalist sentiment, came to a brief end after the election of technocrat Mario Monti.

Monti, an economist by trade, was quick to understand the problem and to identify solutions.  His most effective solution was putting into place emergency austerity measures which raised taxes and cut welfare.  Italians quickly grew to hate the austerity measures and their champion, Mario Monti.  In February of 2013, new elections were held in Italy after Mario Monti announced his forced retirement.  Although there was no clear victor (new elections will soon be held), the 'disgraced' Berlusconi still managed to attract almost one third of the vote, an indication of how unpopular the austerity measures are with Italians.